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Abstract Investments in technology create a large
amount of capital investments by major companies.
Assessing such investment projects is identified as critical
to the efficient assignment of resources. Viewing invest-
ment projects as real options, this paper expands a method
for assessing technology investment decisions in the link-
age existence of uncertainty and competition. It combines
the game-theoretic models of strategic market interactions
with a real options approach. Several key characteristics
underlie the model. First, our study shows how investment
strategies rely on competitive interactions. Under the force
of competition, firms hurry to exercise their options early.
The resulting ‘‘hurry equilibrium’’ destroys the option
value of waiting and involves violent investment behavior.
Second, we get best investment policies and critical
investment entrances. This suggests that integrating will be
unavoidable in some information product markets. The
model creates some new intuitions into the forces that
shape market behavior as noticed in the information tech-
nology industry. It can be used to specify best investment
policies for technology innovations and adoptions, multi-
stage R&D, and investment projects in information
technology.
Keywords Investment analysis  Real options  Game
theory  Information technology
Introduction
Investments in information technologies
Historically, creating infrastructure needed huge invest-
ment. In the change from an industrial economy to an
information-based one, companies today invest huge
quantities of resources in new information technologies
(IT) and connected infrastructures. In the information era,
the necessary assets for business success are no longer
factories, but knowledge assets and the allowing techno-
logical infrastructures (Albuquerque and Miao 2014;
Berghman et al. 2012).
From a single firm’s viewpoint, an early investment in
IT infrastructure may result in getting a ‘‘power’’ that
would let the firm take better advantage of future growth
opportunities. This is mainly important for information
thorough firms, where a firm’s information infrastructure
gets progressively essential to its ability to apply new
business strategies. An ordinary benefit of IT investments
is the ability to engage in the product markets at lower
incremental cost or better customer attraction. Particularly,
a firm that has already made such IT-increasing infras-
tructure investments might launch new business strategies
that create or support competitive benefits at lower cost
compared with other firms that have not made similar
investments (Alexandrov and Deb 2012; Amram and
Kulatilaka 1999; Gao et al. 2013).
The difficulty in evaluating IT investments
Proof has shown that businesses have problems in assess-
ing investment decisions in IT field. Part of these problems
were presented as the ‘‘productivity paradox’’ (Brynjolfs-
son 1993; Dewan and Kraemer 1998). So far, the
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assessment problem is basic to the continuous innovation
and application of IT in business. To assess IT investment
is hard because available assessment methods have not
developed at the same speed as the needs of present
practice. IT investments provide firms with growth chances
to change to new business events, or get business growth
through the exercise of IT-based strategies. Besides,
strategic IT investments often affect the behavior of par-
ticipants. From these causes, assessment of an investment
project relied on potential competitive effect is different
from assessment relied on cash flows (Dimitrios et al.
2013; Merali et al. 2012).
Assessing IT investment projects creates a few problems
that investing in the traditional assets does not introduce.
The emphasis shifts from calculating the cash flows to
assessing strategic effects that IT investments give: the
value of real-time information, managerial flexibility, the
ability to answer to unpredicted moves by opponents, and
an improved information infrastructure that may have a
long-term suggestion for the competitiveness of the firm.
To express the value of the decision flexibility set in
technology investments, we need searching for new
methods to assess technology investment projects (Bergh-
out and Tan 2013; Khallaf 2012).
Technology investments as real options
Investment projects in IT can be analyzed as sets of real
options: a firm with an opportunity to invest in a technol-
ogy is taking an option similar to a financial call option—it
has the right, but not the need, to get the asset at some
future time. So, making an investment is similar to exer-
cising a call option with an exercise price proper for the
investment expenses, and the underlying asset is the new
technology. From a real options viewpoint, also, IT
investment is about real options. Real options can be either
‘‘simple’’ options or combined options. A ‘‘simple’’ option
is almost like a call option where the exercise of the option
guides to the gain of the underlying asset. In combined
options, the exercise of one option guides to the gain of
another option. Most of the sequential investments can be
analyzed as combined options in the feeling the investment
in one period gives the firm the option to continue to the
next period. Today’s investments may have characteristics
that will allow a firm to exercise a particular strategy in the
future (Fernandes et al. 2013; McIntyre and Chintakananda
2013; Rohlfs and Madlener 2013).
As discussed earlier, investing in growth options rather
than cash flows is one of the key characteristics of tech-
nology investment. Many multiperiod strategic investments
have a negative NPV when analyzed without relation to
others, even though they may have significant growth
option value. The NPV and options valuation methods may
give different results.
The likeness between financial and real options gives the
potential the options-pricing theory could be expanded to
assessing investment decisions on technological assets?
Nonetheless studies of real-options based method for IT
investments are still rare; the literature appears in this area,
specifying the increasing attention paid to real options.
Its benefit over other capital budgeting methods like
DCF analysis has been broadly identified in considering the
strategic investment decision under uncertainties (Amram
and Kulatilaka 1999; Luehrman 1998a, b). Smith and
McCardle (1998, 1999) moreover show that option pricing
can be combined with a standard decision analysis frame-
work to get the best of the both worlds. Some previous IS
researches have identified many IT investment projects
hold some option—like characteristics (Clemons; Dos
Santos 1991; Kumar 1996). Benaroch and Kauffman
(1999) and Taudes et al. (2000) have applied the real
options theory to real-world business cases and assessed
this approach’s benefits as a tool for IT investment plan-
ning. Kim and Sanders (2002) expand a framework of
strategic actions relied on real option theory. Some
researchers use real options combined with game theory to
analyze strategic technology adoption. For example Huis-
man and Kort (2004) find out a dynamic duopoly in which
firms take part in the adoption of new technologies. Smit
and Trigeorgis (2006) illustrate the use of real options
valuation and game theory concepts to consider original
investment opportunities including important strategic
decisions under uncertainty. It uses innovation cases,
unions and gains to discuss strategic and competitive fea-
tures, applicable in industries like consumer electronics and
telecom. Wu and Ong (2008) in an interesting paper used
real options analysis in association with classical financial
theory, specifically, the Mean–Variance (MV) model to
give new viewpoints on project selection. Pendharkar
(2010) used the market asset disclaimer supposition and
expand a binomial lattice based real options model to
involve cash flow interrelations between multiperiod IT
investments. Wu et al. (2012) use a combination of real
options and game theory to consider the investment
strategies of a case company in the TFT-LCD industry.
Martzoukos and Zacharias (2013) demonstrate to decision
makers how to optimally make costly strategic pre-in-
vestment R&D decisions in the existence of full results in
an option pricing structure with logical tractability. van Zee
and Spinler (2014) illustrates a real options method for
valuing public-sector research and development projects,
using a down-and-out barrier option.
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Competition in technology investment
Viewing an IT investment project as a real option puts
greater importance on the possibilities and benefits of
postponing investment to wait for more information to
resolve uncertainty. Although, investment opportunities for
new technologies are scarcely dedicated, as thorough
competition and low barriers of entrance are distinguishing
features of the IT industry. Competition over limited
investment opportunities may decrease a firm’s option
value, or still force the option to run out too early.
Therefore, the timing of the investment decision could
have notable results on the recognized value of the project
(Bos et al. 2013; Chaton and Guillerminet 2013).
When to exercise a real option is a strategic decision. If
the option is non-dedicated, the firm and its competitors
hold an option on the identical asset, and whoever exer-
cises first may get the fundamental asset. The problem is
that provided uncertainty stays on the market or technol-
ogy, no one can be certain that they want the asset. The
problem is naturally that no firm knows what condition the
game will be in at future times. Also, in a market of
incomplete competition, one firm’s decision could change
the market price and structure. This may have extra
strategic impacts on competitor’s behavior.
Another typical supposition made in the most of the
literature is that information is symmetric that means each
firm has complete information about the other’s profit
structures and that they split similar opinions about future
market demands. That is, market demand may continue
stochastically, but this is supposed to be public informa-
tion. So firms are critically supposed to be consistently
informed, and no personal and incomplete information is
included. Although, in the real world, competition often
happens in a situation of information asymmetry. That is,
companies have incomplete and asymmetrically assigned
information on boundaries like development costs or
market demands (Lestage et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2012;
Wrzaczek and Kort 2012).
In this paper analyzing the common results of both
uncertainty and competition, this paper expands a method
to assess investment decisions in an oligopolistic structure.
It combines the real options structure with strategic limits
of game theory, and prepares a greater comprehension of
the results of uncertainty and competition on the strategic
exercise of real options inserted in technology investments.
Major contributions of the paper
The majority of real options researches, has concen-
trated on business sector situations without strategic
collaborations. The extensive greater part of the models
of capital speculations, which utilize a real options
methodology, has regularly been founded on two par-
ticular suspicions: (a) the firm has an imposing business
model control over a venture opportunity; and (b) the
item market is consummately aggressive. Accordingly,
speculation not influence either costs or business sector
structure. Strategic issues have rather fallen in the space
of modern association. The strategic methodology in
modern association writing endogenizes business sector
structure; be that as it may, it regularly disregards
instability and along these lines the option value of
adaptability.
Considering the joint impacts of both uncertainty and
competition, this paper adds to a system to assess specu-
lation choices in an oligopolistic business sector structure.
The technique separates itself by demonstrating options
exercise under endogenous, multi-period competition in the
setting of innovation speculation. Through building up a
balance model of a dynamic venture diversion, the paper
makes a few particular commitments:
First, our study amplifies the ordinary single-spe-
cialists improvement models to a game-theoretic set-
ting that consolidates numerous, contending firms.
Under the weight of aggressive acquisition, firms race
to practice their alternatives early. This significantly
dissolves the option value of holding up and changes
the key conduct of capital speculation. The model’s
consequences help clarify some forceful venture
examples saw in the IT industry. The second contri-
bution is identified with the assessment of real options
when the suspicions for monetary option valuing
hypothesis no more hold. On the off chance that the
future settlements and the dangers of an innovation
speculation undertaking can be reproduced by
exchanged resources, the valuation of real option is the
clear utilization of the money related option valuation
models. Be that as it may, difficulty arises in most of
the real asset investment projects. We propose a
technique taking into account diversion hypothesis and
dynamic programming to assess speculation projects
when suspicions for financial option pricing hypothesis
don’t hold. Third, we derive optimal venture approa-
ches and basic speculation limits. The model is further
stretched out to the multi-period setting. Dynamic
programming is utilized to handle between worldly
speculation choices. Forth, our work amplifies the full-
data models in the researches to a more practical
uneven data connection.
In summarize, the differences between our present
model and the real options models in the literature are:
J Ind Eng Int (2016) 12:361–375 363
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• Our model includes strategic interactions and compet-
itive risks;
• These strategic elements influence the equilibrium and
investment behavior (such as early exercise and violent
investment);
• The option value is lower but more realistic than that
examined in the real options literature;
• Our model analyzes asymmetric information.
• Our model identifies the option value of waiting to
better resolve uncertainty;
• This option value is not only conceptualized but also
quantified in the present model;
• We continue the consideration to multi-period setting
with the linkage existence of continuous uncertainty
and competition through a method called ‘‘dynamic
programming with externalities’’;
• We endogenize the timing and the leader–follower
sequence of investment.
The impact of competition on investment: a simple
model
In this section, we use a simple model to show the basic
ideas of investment under competition. First, let us explain
the particular problem. Assume firm X encounters a deci-
sion whether to take on an investment project. For a cost of
C, firm X can commercialize a new technology and begin a
product into the market. The market demand is uncertain.
To remain it simple, suppose the market demand could be
‘‘low’’ with probability p or ‘‘high’’ with probability 1 - p.
The net edge of purchasing one unit of the product is s
dollars. Suppose the firm uses a discount rate of i. The
project life is n years; technology grows outdated next. For
clarity, suppose that if the firm waits a year it will be able
to analyze uncertainty. If we follow the traditional DCF
analysis, we may calculate NPV as follows:













The NPV rule would tell us to drop the project if
NPV\ 0, invest if NPV[ 0, and be unconcerned if
NPV = 0.
The option to defer investment
A key defect of the above static analysis is that it ignores
the option to ‘‘wait and see’’. The investment opportunity is
not a ‘‘now-or-never’’ selection. The firm could wait to get
more information about the market uncertainty. Figure 1
shows this ‘‘wait and see’’ option.
The NPV of this ‘‘wait and see’’ option is
NPV ðwaitÞ ¼ p


















The difference between these values in (1) and (2) show
the value of the ‘‘wait and see’’ option. Therefore,
O ¼ NPVwait  NPVinvest nowj j ð3Þ
The options-based analysis expresses the value of
waiting, which is a development over the static NPV
method. Although, it is right only if the investment
opportunity stays obtainable for the firm during the period
of waiting (Meyer and Rees 2012). This is to suppose the
investment opportunity is dedicated, i.e., only one firm has
the ability to go into the market. So, the above analysis
may have overestimated the option value of waiting as it
ignores the risk of competitive entrance.
Investment opportunity under competition
To cure the above consideration, our model would have to
include the risk of competitive entrance. Assume market
research leads us to think that with probability q one of the
participating firms will enter the market during the first
period. Figure 2 shows a changed model that involves
competition.
From the real options’ viewpoint, the option may be
pressure to expire rashly because of competitive entrance.
This alters the NPV of the ‘‘wait and see’’ alternative to:
Fig. 1 The option to defer investment
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¼ ð1 qÞNPV ðwait, no competition)
ð4Þ
Similar to the description in (3), the option value is the
distinction between the two NPV values in (1) and (4), i.e.,
Owith competition ¼ NPVwait:with competition  NPVinvest now
ð5Þ
It is easy to prove that (4) is smaller than (2), as long as
q[ 0: That is to say, the option value of waiting with
competition is smaller than that without competition, as
long as there is a positive probability of competitive
entrance. By analyzing the result of competition on the real
options value, we could say that competition abrade the
option value of waiting.
An example
To put the above examination in the connection of a par-
ticular illustration, we accept the numbers are: C = $7500,
p = 0.75, i = 15 %, s = $12, DL = D, DH = 2D. Sup-
pose D is known and D = 97.5. Subsequent to connecting
to these numbers, Eqs. (1) and (2) yield NPV (invest
now) = 408 and NPV (wait) = 1083, respectively. Hence,
conceding the choice has an advantage. In the wake of
watching the business sector and getting more data, it may
choose to contribute if the business sector interest ends up
being ‘‘high’’, and not to contribute if the interest is ‘‘low’’.
In this illustration, the alternative to hold up gives the firm
an extra estimation of 675.
If D is unknown, the value of immediate investment
becomes














¼ 7500þ 121:68D ð6Þ
For D[ 92.475, this NPV will be positive, and the
customary NPV rule would recommend contribute
promptly. Note, then again, that project will wind up being
a cash washout if interest ends up being DL as opposed to
DH. For this situation, the ‘‘invest now’’ option will be
productive with no danger of misfortune just if
D[ 138.705.
Under symmetric information, we may expect that it is
normal learning that the venture will be productive without
a doubt if D[ 138.705. Firm A knows this through the
estimation we simply did. Firm B can obviously realize this
by comparative examination. Firm A ought to expect that
firm B will enter the business sector amid first period if
firm A not so that the ‘‘wait’’ option will have an estimation
of 0 for D[ 138.705. Thus, the hold up’s estimation
option gets to be
NPV ðwait) ¼
0; D\ 74:055






For the interest region D 2 ð74:055; 138:705Þ; there is a
likelihood that the contender will enter the business sector
in the first place, and firm A will lose its option.
Fig. 2 Investment option under
competition
J Ind Eng Int (2016) 12:361–375 365
123
Insights
When uncertainties exist about the values of key limits,
companies often postpone their investment decisions until
the key uncertainties have been (fairly) resolved. Although,
as we have noticed in real technology investments, com-
panies sometimes do perpetrate investment at an early
period despite their ability to postpone their decision.
Companies that do so must believe the cost of postponing
the investment is greater than the value abandoned from
initial exercise (Bacchiega et al. 2012; Briglauer et al.
2013; Koetter and Noth 2013).
In summary, under the NPV, companies do not see the
value of waiting, while under the options theory; the
value of waiting is engaged but overestimated because of
the lack of competition. By correctly including compe-
tition in our model, we have an option value that is lower
but more practical. The existence of competition abrades
the option value of waiting, because chip investments by
the competition can abrade or even prevent benefits.
Although how precisely competition abrades benefits or
prevents investment options will rely on the market
framework and each firm’s strategic calculation. To
engage this, we have to model competition internally by
using a game-theoretic method, a topic we are now
turning to.
Strategic exercise of growth options
under imperfect competition: a game-theoretic
model
In a real world, the investment decisions are affected by a
private firm with individual favorites and inconsistent
motivations. Besides, each competitor’s investment
decision is dependent on and sensitive to the other’s
moves. Game theory provides the method to determine
how the players will act when each requests to maximize
his own benefit. In such a game-theoretic situation, the
value of a real option can be engaged only if it is exer-
cised in a best way, which is fairly dependent on the right
expectation of competitors’ motions (Flaig et al. 2013; Li
et al. 2013).
Model assumptions
To analyzing competition, we assume (1) competitors
make logical tradeoffs in specifying when to exercise their
options, so showing optimizing behavior; (2) each player
decides by seeing a continuous uncertain state variable and
expecting competitor’s motions; and (3) the payoffs rely on
the resulting equilibrium.
Subgame equilibrium
The option exercise game
To highlight the applicability of the method, we concen-
trate on a special real-world problem: the investment
decisions of two firms that are analyzing investing in a new
technology. At any time t, a firm can spend Ci;t to get the
technology, for which expected future cash flows depen-
dent on tackling the project have a present value Vi;t: This
is a 2-stage decision.
Normally, Ci;t and Ii;t are stochastic. We stress the value
of Vi;t could be notably influenced by the competitor’s
decisions. So, this two-period model is representative of a
wide category of technology investment problems: one first
invests in capacities, then gets some extra information, and
eventually uses capacities dependent on the displayed
information. More accurately, we explain the dynamic
option-exercise game below:
• Players: Firm X and firm Y.
• Strategies: At the investment period, both firms deter-
mine either to invest or postpone in an indivisible
technology that requires a rough investment cost, Ci;t: If
a firm resolves invest, it also needs to determine, at the
commercialization period, how much to produce, i.e., a
quantity qi ði ¼ X; YÞ that maximizes its expected
payoff. Therefore each firm has a strategic space
ri ¼ ðC;D; qijCÞ; ði ¼ X; YÞ:
• Payoffs: The payoff to firm i is a function of the
strategies selected by it and its competitor. If both firms
X and Y invest without watching each other’s decision,
they will divide the market as stated by Nash–Cournot
equilibrium. If one firm invests first and the other does
later, their payoffs will be mentioned through Stackel-
berg leader–follower equilibrium. If one firm invests
first, but the other never does, then the earlier will enjoy
a monopoly position. We suppose that a firm’s payoff is
directly the present value of its profit stream, siðqi; qjÞ:
Subgame equilibrium results
To solve the game, we first get the equilibrium quantities
and payoffs for the commercialization period by cost and
demand boundaries from an optimization process. These
will serve as creating blocks in our following analysis of
Nash–Cournot equilibrium under internal competition.
Assume the reverse demand function is given by
Pðat;QÞ ¼ at  ðbXqX þ bYqYÞ ð8Þ
where at is the stochastic demand-shift parameter, depict-
ing the uncertainty in market demand, with expected value
E0½at ¼ a0[ 0: In this model, at is supposed to develop as
366 J Ind Eng Int (2016) 12:361–375
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stated by a binomial process. Q ¼ qX þ qY is the total
quantity on the market, where qX and qY are the quantities
provided by firms X and Y respectively. Without loss of
generality, assume bX ¼ bY ¼ b; then (6) becomes
Pðat;QÞ ¼ at  bðqX þ qYÞ: Show Ci as firm i’s cost
function, i.e.,
CiðqiÞ ¼ ciqi þ F ð9Þ
where F is the fixed cost, and ci is the marginal cost.
Without loss of generality, suppose F = 0.
Concurrent decisions If firms X and Y make their deci-
sions without noticing each other, each would have
incomplete information about the other’s real motions. This
is equal to the situation in which they decide at the same




siðqi; qjÞ ¼ max
qi
Pðat; ðqi þ qjÞÞqi  ciqi
  ð10Þ
where siði ¼ X; YÞ is firm i’s profit, and qi; qj are quantities





ðai  2ci þ cjÞ ð11Þ
The related equilibrium profit for each firm is
si ¼ 1
9b
ðat  2ci þ cjÞ2 ð12Þ




\0; so these quantities selects
maximize profit. If the two firms have similar cost struc-
tures, i.e., ci ¼ cj ¼ c then the equilibrium quantity and
profit will be symmetric:
qi ¼ qj ¼
1
3b
ðat  cÞ ð13-1Þ
si ¼ sj ¼ 1
9b
ðat  cÞ2 ð13-2Þ
Sequential decisions If two firms move sequentially, the
game would begin in an information structure that one firm
can notice the other’s move. Assume firm X invests first
and firm Y, on seeing X’s move, follows up. We use the
backward method to solve the game. Supposing the leader
is already in the market, the follower’s decision is
max
qY
sYðqX; qYÞ ¼ maxqY Pðat; ðq

X þ qYÞÞ  cY
 
qY ð14Þ
Expecting the follower’s move, the leader’s decision is
max
qX






Solving the optimization problems in (13) and (14)








ðat  3cj þ 2ciÞ
ð16Þ
Their related equilibrium profits will then be
si ¼ 1
8b
ðat  2ci þ cjÞ2
sj ¼ 1
16b
ðat  3cj þ 2ciÞ2
ð17Þ
where the subscript i depicts the leader, j the follower.
If the technology is good for multiple periods, we
require to reduce the future cash flows. Assuming the
operating cash flows si last n periods, the NPVi of the profit
values will be




ð1þ iÞt  Ci ð18Þ
where si is the operating profit in each period and i is the
discount rate. If the technology can produce incomes infi-
nitely, the NPVi of the constant cash flows would be
NPVi ¼ Vi  Ci ¼ si
i
 Ci ð19Þ
The exercise of growth options under competition
We now analyze the decision whether to make the strategic
investment in the first stage. Without the beginning
investment, the two firms would take their existing tech-
nologies (and related costs) as given.
Model assumptions
We analyze the investment decision in two conditions: (1)
one developing firm has a devoted option to make the
beginning investment, but two firms contend directly in the
second period; and (2) the option is shared by the two
firms, i.e., both firms can invest in the new technology even
lessen future costs.
Devoted investment by the developing firm
Consider first the case where firm X makes no beginning
investment, so ex post it has no strategic benefit over its
competitor. If both firms select to sell on the market, they
encounter the same marginal cost c. The equilibrium
quantity and profit are precisely the same as in (13-1) and
(13-2), with c being returned by C, i.e.,
qi ¼ qj ¼
1
3b
ðat  cÞ ð20Þ
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si ¼ sj ¼ 1
9b
ðat  cÞ2 ð21Þ
On the other hand, if firm X makes the strategic
investment therefore reducing its marginal cost to cX ¼
c\c ¼ cY the market interaction is influenced by its
technological benefit, which is admitted by firm Y when









ðat  2cþ cÞ ð22-2Þ

















It is now optimal for firm Y to select a lower quantity,
resulting a lower benefit and smaller market share, because
of the strategic result of firm X’s investment.
As we can see, the cost benefit got from the strategic
investment grows firm X’s benefits and market share. So,
the strategic investment creates a competitive advantage. It
may be valuable to decay the growth option got by strategic
investment in two pieces. First, it results in a lower ‘‘unit
exercise price’’ ðc\cÞ for future expansion. Second, the
optimal output qX ; ‘‘the number of unit production options
that are optimally exercised’’, also grows, as other com-
petitors select to limit their own output to make room for
the stronger firm. The optimal investment policy is sum-
marized in the following proposition:




X ¼ inf at:NPVCX NPVDX
  ð25Þ
Strategic investment is optimal when demand is more than
this entrance.
[Here, we accept the proposition and other presented
propositions without proof. For considering the complete
proof and further reading of these propositions, please refer
to Azevedo and Paxson (2010, 2014) and Nishihara
(2011)].
Concurrent investments by both firms
We now expand the basic model in the last section of the
case when neither firm likes to devote protection (license)
on the strategic investment, meaning the investment
opportunity is open to all competitors.
Model assumptions
Both firms X and Y can invest in the new technology to
lessen their future costs to c. The final market results could
be a monopoly, symmetric or asymmetric Cournot equi-
librium, or no investment. Figure 3 shows the four possible
combinations: (I, I), (I, D), (D, I), (D, D) where I means
‘‘invest’’ and D ‘‘defer’’.
Particularly, the first-stage investment game may result
in a second-period commercialization period with the fol-
lowing possible results: symmetric but lower costs for both
firms (both invested), asymmetric production costs (one
firm invested) and the same the existing state of affairs
costs of the existing technology (neither invested in the
new technology; Huang and Behara 2013).
We have the following result:
Proposition 2 The equilibria to exercise the investment
option are
ðI; IÞ; if a[ cþ 3 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃbiCp
ðD;DÞ; if a cþ 2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃbiCp ð26Þ
Mixed strategy (I, D) or (D, I), if cþ 2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃbiCp \
a cþ 3 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃbiCp .
That is, optimal investment strategy is concurrent
investment by both firms if a[ cþ 3 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃbiCp ; mixed strategy
by either firm if cþ 2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃbiCp \a cþ 3 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃbiCp ; and no
investment by both if a cþ 2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃbiCp : The demand entrance
for concurrent investment is
aII






We use a multi-period game tree structure as a thorough-
form representation of the option exercise game. Firms X
and Y determine either to invest (I) or defer (D) in each
period. Then Nature (N), which shows the external uncer-
tainty, determines the market demand will be either moved
up to ua or down to da similar to a binomial process, where
u and d are the binomial parameters. On noticing the
decisions made in the previous period and developing the
market demand, each firm determines once more to invest
or defer in the next period. The game can continue as many
periods as required. In a multi-period setting, dynamic
programming and backward induction allow us with the
368 J Ind Eng Int (2016) 12:361–375
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mathematical tools to solve multiple period problems
(Huang and Qiao 2012). Specially, the value function of
the investment project can be shown by the ‘‘Bellman’’
equation:
VðxÞ ¼ max E½si  C; 1




where V(x) is the value of the investment project, x the state
variable, C the investment cost, s the expected cash flows
dependent on the investment has been made, and i the
discount rate. V 0ðxÞ is the future extension value dependent
on the present state variable.
The first term in (26) depicts the value of exercising the
option, while the second term chooses the value of exten-
sion (i.e., holding the option). In every period, each firm
would distinguish these two terms, taking analysis what the
other firm would do.
Two-period equilibrium
We now appeal the dynamic structure in the two-period
case, where the option to make the strategic investment
stays obtainable for two periods. The demand entrance and
the investment strategy are summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 Both firms exercise their options concur-













Investment entrance (27) specifies that a2p

0 is an
increasing function of the volatility of the market demand,
interest rate, marginal cost, and the investment cost. So
firms would incline to wait longer if the market is more
unpredictable, if the technology costs more to install, or if
the cost demotion is small. Reasons like lower uncertainty,
shorter option life, and more thorough competition would
incline to lower the investment entrance. A lower invest-
ment entrance suggests the lower option value of waiting

























where r measures the volatility of the market uncertainty.
Higher volatility r suggests a higher investment entrance,
a: So, if the uncertainty is high, firms incline to wait
longer. In other words, higher volatility suggests greater
option value to defer investment. From (29), we have the
following corollary:
Corollary The investment entrance of the two periods is
higher than that of one period.
More periods
When the game lasts 3, 4, 5,… and n periods, the same
method appeals often. One can always work backwards all
the way to the beginning period. One just roll the equi-
librium payoffs of the period t back to the previous period
(t - 1) until one achieves the present period of the game.
Relied on the NPVi’s of different chances, each firm
resolves its best strategies. Attention the game revives itself
if it gets a (D, D) division.
Effects of competition on investment
The option value of waiting in a two-period game is
Fig. 3 Concurrent investment
in growth options (the dotted
line shows the information
structure that firm Y cannot see
the firm’s action)




























where q shows the probability in a risk-neutral world, i the
discount rate, and u the binomial factor ‘‘up’’. Equa-
tion (30) illustrates the option value is a growing function
of u and q, meaning the firms would be more possible to
wait if the extent and chance of demand rising motion are
larger than if they are small.
It can be proved the option value under competition in
(30) is lower than that without competition (i.e., the option
value of waiting for a monopoly as in Dixit and Pindyck
1994). That is, competition abrades the option value. The
real options literature has explored the option value of
waiting for a firm when payoffs are stochastic and invest-
ment irreparable. It has been illustrated in these studies that
firms will typically delay investing until well after the point
at which supposed discounted benefits identical beginning
costs. In so doing, they use the option value of waiting.
Although, the option value of waiting may have been
overestimated when the risk of competitive abrasion or
prevention is excluded (Smit and Trigeorgis 2006; Alek-
sandrov et al. 2013; Levaggi et al. 2012; Podoynitsyna
et al. 2013). Certainly, the option value without competi-
tion is only an upper limit of the option value with com-
petition. So, including competition is important to get a
practical option valuation.
Discussions and extensions
New and existing technologies
The vital benefit of the investment is a more logical tech-
nology with lower marginal cost. That is, the marginal cost
of selling one unit to the market will be lower with the
investment than that without the investment. As a result,
the first-period investment may result in a second-period
competitive benefit about its competitor, with the following
possible results: symmetric but lower costs for both firms
(if both invested), asymmetric production costs (if one firm
invested), and the same base-case costs related to the
existing technology (if neither invested in the new
technology).
In the above consideration, we have supposed there was
an existing technology. Firms invest to improve or return
the old technology. Another case is there is no existing
technology so far, firms invest to enter this new product
market. Without the new technology, firms would have to
stay out the market and make zero income.
These two conditions can be summarized more accu-
rately. The option value of continuation, C, is either zero or
positive. That is,
C ¼
0 no prior tech exist
1
9ib




We supposed earlier that, for both firms, the investment
would result the same benefit (cost decline), i.e., the
technologies got through beginning investment have the
identical marginal costs. What if the investments may
result in technologies with different costs?
Consider the cost first. Assume cX[ cY , from (21) and




ðat  2cX þ cYÞ2\sY ¼
1
9b



















That is, if to implement the new technology results in a
lower cost for firm Y than for firm X, then firm Y would
have greater motivation to invest in the technology first.



















then firm Y will invest first still in the middle area. Con-
sequently the diversified investment strategy, (I, D) and (D,
I), is substituted by (D, I), a sequential investment strategy
where the firm with lower marginal cost (firm Y in this
case) will invest first.
Second, the investment may result in different quality of
product or service, as evaluated by the parameter b, in (7).
Assuming bX[ bY meaning firm Y’s product is better
recognized by the customers, the investment would result
in a higher payoff function, and lower investment entrance,
for firm Y. Eventually, all these factors are normally inte-
grated. It is hard to see that a company with higher mar-
ginal cost and lower quality can continue in the market.
Generally a firm with higher cost may like a better product.
Asymmetric information
Until now we have limited our consideration to option
exercise under an information structure in which firms have
symmetric information. Although in real world, investment
and competition often happen in an environment of infor-
mation asymmetry. That is, companies may have
370 J Ind Eng Int (2016) 12:361–375
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incomplete and asymmetrically scattered information on
parameters like development costs or market demands. In
this section, we emphasize on information asymmetry and
its effect on option exercise. In an option-exercise game
with full information, the firms’ payoff functions are gen-
eral knowledge. In a game with incomplete information, in
contrast, at the minimum one firm is unsure about another
firm’s payoff or cost functions. An equilibrium pricing
method must be used in a world of asymmetric informa-
tion. The equilibrium method moderates the tradability
suppositions required for arbitrage pricing (Batabyal 2012;
Schwienbacher 2013). To avoid further problem, we
assume risk neutrality, so prices are specified by dis-
counting expected values, where the supposition is
dependent on the obtainable information. Besides, we
suppose the investment project under consideration is a
small part of the firm’s total assets.
Given the role of asymmetric information, changing the
full-information supposition will add notable realism to the
models of option exercise and technology investments. A
few recent studies involve asymmetric information in their
models. For example, Grenadier (1999) shows how infor-
mation externalities may be created through noted option
exercise decisions. Nadiminti et al. (2002) analyze intra-
firm resource assignment under asymmetric information
and negative externalities . These studies represent the fast
evolution of the field.
Model assumptions of asymmetric information
We define the asymmetric information as follows:
(1) Information is incomplete and asymmetric. Firm
X knows its own cost function,
CXðqXÞ ¼ cXqX ð36Þ
but has only incomplete information about firm Y’s
cost function. The following probability distribution
shows firm X’s opinion about firm Y’s cost function:
CYðqYÞ ¼ cHqY with probability hcLqY with probability 1 h

ð37Þ
where cL\cX\cH (to avoid unimportant cost
benefit).
(2) Firm Y realizes both firms’ cost functions, therefore
has better information. Firm Y could have just
created a new technology, and its cost has not got
public information so far. On the other hand, firm
X continues to use the traditional technology of
which the cost is generally known.
(3) All of this is usual knowledge: firm X realizes that
firm Y has better information, firm Y knows that firm
X realizes this, and so on.
(4) The inverse demand function and the stochastic
demand-shift parameter are described.
In such a game with incomplete information, we say that
firm Y has two possible types, cL and cH or its type space is
TY ¼ fcL; cHg: Firm X’s type space is simply TX ¼ fcXg:
Firm Y realizes its own type besides firm X’s type, while
firm X is uncertain about the Y’s type. Formally,
PXðtY ¼ cH jtX ¼ cXÞ ¼ h;
PXðtY ¼ cLjtX ¼ cXÞ ¼ 1 h
ð38Þ
Sequential exercises
The sequencing of exercises is critical for an option-ex-
ercise game under asymmetric information, because
decisions about exercise (and nonexercise) may release
private information, as one firm can notice the other.
Firms can gather information by moving later than others.
The order of moves suggests each firm’s calculated
tradeoff between the strategic result of exercising early
and the informational benefit of waiting to learn com-
petitors’ individual information through their disclosed
actions. In the literature, the sequencing of actions has
been normally supposed to be pre-determined. In contrast,
we permit the sequencing of exercise to be internally
mentioned through agents’ optimizing decisions. Two
sequences are possible:
Sequence 1 The less informed firm (X) moves first and
the more informed firm (Y) follows.
In the spirit of backward induction, we first solve the
follower’s decision. Supposing the leader has already
decided qX ; the follower will choose qY to maximize its
profit dependent on its cost structures, i.e.,
max
qY ðcHÞ
sYðqX ; qY ; cHÞ
¼ max
qY ðcHÞ






sYðqX ; qY ; cLÞ
¼ max
qY ðcLÞ




The leader’s decision, expecting firm Y’s above move, is


















at  2cX þ hcH þ ð1 hÞcL½  ð42Þ





ðat  3cH þ 2cXÞ þ
1 h
4b




ðat  3cL þ 2cXÞ 
h
4b
ðcH  cLÞ ð44Þ













ðat  3cL þ 2cXÞ  hðcH  cLÞ½ 2 ð47Þ
Sequence 2 The more informed firm (Y) moves first and
the less informed firm (X) follows.
If the firm with individual information moves first, the
follower would have an opportunity to conclude the lea-
der’s individual information through disclosed effects.
More precisely, firm X would notice Y’s quantity selects
qYðcHÞ; qYðcLÞ, and conclude firm Y’s cost functions, cH or
cL properly. The more informed firm would disclose its
individual information through its exercise decisions.
Because of this information disclosure, the information
asymmetry may be reduced.
On learning firm Y’s individual information about its
cost function, firm X selects its quantity to maximize its
benefit. The learning could disclose two possible results:
firm Y’s cost could be high ðcY ¼ cHÞ and low ðcY ¼ cLÞ:










As well, dependent on that firm X learned cY ¼ cL; firm
X’s decision would be
max
qX






Expecting firm X’s above reaction, firm Y solves for









By the similar analysis, firm Y solves for qYðcLÞ when its









Solving the optimization problems in (46)–(49) results
the below equilibrium quantities:








ðat  2cH þ cXÞ ð53Þ








ðat  2cL þ cXÞ ð55Þ
















ðat  2cL þ cXÞ2 ð59Þ
where (54) and (55) are conditional on cY ¼ cH while (56)
and (57) are dependent on cY ¼ cL:
Equilibrium analysis
When information is asymmetric, equilibrium exercise may
be sequential, with the more informed firm exercising first
and permitting the less informed to free sit on the infor-
mation expressed by the exercise (or failure to exercise).
Although, the information asymmetry is furthermore dif-
ficult by the presence of cost asymmetry. The firm with
lower cost may have lower investment entrance and higher
inducements to move early (Genc and Zaccour 2013). To
make easier resemblance, we achieve the equilibrium
analysis for two situations: (1) we first suppose that firm Y
realizes that its true cost is cY ¼ cL (firm X does not realize
this) in ‘‘Equilibrium under asymmetric information
ðcY ¼ cLÞ’’ section; (2) we then turn to situating cY ¼ cH in
‘‘Equilibrium under asymmetric information ðcY ¼ cHÞ’’
section.
Equilibrium under asymmetric information ðcY ¼ cLÞ
If firm Y realizes that its true cost is low (again firm X does
not realize this because of information asymmetry), firm
Y would exercise its option first to engage the payoff
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benefit. The entire demand range is divided into three
areas, thus area I, waiting region (D, D), area II, sequential
investment region (D, I) and area III, simultaneous
investment region (I, I). This result is formalized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium under asymmetric informa-
tion when cY ¼ cLÞ Under asymmetric information, the
option-exercise game has three equilibria








 a\ 2cX  hcH









Proposition 4 illustrates that when asymmetry exists and
demand is in area II equilibrium exercise will be sequential
and instructive. With asymmetric information, the option
exercise is (D, I); the more informed firm moves first and
engages higher benefits from being a leader. The less
informed firm selects to wait and free sit on the information
expressed by the leader’s exercise. This permits the fol-
lower to conclude the leader’s individual information
through noticed exercise of options. So, in this equilibrium,
the leader gets payoff compensation and the follower gets
informational benefits.
Equilibrium under asymmetric information ðcY ¼ cHÞ
If firm Y knows that its true cost is high (remember firm
X does not know this because of information asymmetry),
firm Y would become unwilling to exercise its option first
because doing so may disclose to its competitor that it is
really a high cost (therefore weak) player. This normally
guides us to feel the equilibrium (D, I) in area II may no
longer exist.
It appears, although, the equilibrium (D, I) still exists,
but with more restrictive situations than in the cY ¼ cL
case. This result is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium under asymmetric informa-
tion when cY ¼ cLÞ Under asymmetric information the
option-exercise game may have the following the arealib-
ria: (D, D) in area I and (I, I) in area III. In area II, the
























The equilibrium may be (I, D), in other respects. The
three areas are explained as


















2cH  cX 
1 h
2





II; the area between regions I and III ð62Þ
Comparative statics
We have considered the existence and the economic
rationality of equilibria for the two conditions above. It is
interesting to distinguish the equilibrium area under
incomplete information to those under full information.
This will also permit us to measure the results of asym-
metric information.
For firm X, the entrance demand levels with full infor-
mation would be








With incomplete information, the relating entrance
(from Proposition 4) becomes





where FI denotes ‘‘full information’’ and II ‘‘incomplete
information’’. aNSðXjcH ;FIÞ stands for the entrance level
that firm X will invest under Nash equilibrium, dependent
on firm X’s having full information and assuming firm Y’s
cost is cH with a probability h ¼ 1: As well, aNSðXjh; IIÞ
depicts the entrance level that firm X will invest under Nash
equilibrium, depending on firm X’s having incomplete
information and assuming firm Y’s cost is cH with proba-
bility h: From (61), we have
oaNSðXjh; IIÞ
oh
¼ ðcH  cLÞ\ 0 ð65Þ
Thus aNSðXjh; IIÞ is a reducing function of h; suggesting
that firm X would invest at a lower entrance (so more
violently) if it has a stronger opinion that its competitor is a
high cost player. This is regular with what we have learned
in previous sections. It can be confirmed that
aNSðXjcH ;FIÞ\ aNSðXjcL;FIÞ ð66Þ
As a consequence, the full-information entrance levels
are directly specific cases of the asymmetric-information
entrance. More generally, the full-information equilibrium
J Ind Eng Int (2016) 12:361–375 373
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is a special case of the asymmetric-information equilib-
rium. From firm Y’s view, the entrance levels are




























In a world of asymmetric information, aNSðY jcL; IIÞ is
greater than aNSðY jcL;FIÞ and aNSðY jcH ; IIÞ is less than
aNSðY jcH ;FIÞ: The difference is larger if the information
asymmetry is notable (as measured by h and
Dc ¼ cH  cL). This happens because firm Y not only
adjusts its entrance to its own cost but also replies to the
fact that firm X has incomplete information and thus cannot
do the same. If firm Y’s costs are high, for example it waits
longer and invest at an entrance that is higher than firm
X would do if it knew with full information firm Y’s costs
to be high.
Conclusions
Most of the real options literature has concentrated on
market environments without strategic interactions. On the
other hand, the industrial organization literature endoge-
nizes market structure; so far it usually neglects uncertainty
and so the option value of flexibility. Considering the
linkage effects of both uncertainty and competition, this
paper extends a method for assessing technology invest-
ment decisions in an oligopolistic market structure. It
combines the game-theoretic models of strategic market
interactions with a real options approach to investment
under uncertainty, and gives an improved comprehension
of the results of uncertainty and competition on the
strategic exercise of real options inserted in technology
investments.
Through expanding an equilibrium model of a dynamic
investment game, the paper makes several contributions.
First, showing that investment strategies critically rely on
competitive interactions, the study improves our compre-
hension of the linkage effects of competition and uncer-
tainty on investment decisions. We have best investment
policies and vital investment entrances. Besides, we have
also taken analysis of different information structures.
One of the restrictions of the paper is the work is mostly
methodological and theoretical—appealing economic
models to technology investment under both uncertainty
and competition. Although we have tried to link the theory
to fact, the work could be improved by adding some
practical elements. However, the results got in the paper
could be used to form theories to carry out practical testing.
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